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NOTES
FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON TARGET DEFENSIVE
TACTICS: APPLYING EDGAR v. MITE CORP. TO
THE "PRIVATE CONDUCT" OF TARGET
DIRECTORS
Delaware's takeover statute1 stands in stark contrast to the takeover
legislation invalidated in Edgar v. MITE Corp.2 and the "second genera-
tion" statutes enacted in its wake.3 The Delaware statute only modestly
regulates the takeover process, and avoids many of the provisions struck
down in MITE. Delaware, moreover, has resisted the trend toward en-
acting strong legislation to protect local businesses from takeover
threats.4 Nevertheless, neither Delaware's nor its corporations' interests
remain unprotected in corporate control contests.
Sanctioned under Delaware law target defensive tactics5 provide cor-
porate management with ample means to repel most hostile takeover
bids.6 In takeover contests, the interests of target management and the
1. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1983). The Delaware statute requires a bidder to deliver to
the target corporation a written statement of its intention to make an offer and other information
twenty to sixty days prior to making the offer. Id. at § 203(a)(1). The statute prescribes a minimum
offering period of twenty days, during which bidders must extend shareholders withdrawal and pro
rata rights. Id. at §§ 203(a)(2) & (3). Competing bidders may commence bids simultaneously with
the original bidder, even though they file notice within twenty days before the original bid com-
mences. Id. at § 203(b)(1). Moreover, once the original bidder commences its offer, subsequent
bidders may stipulate shorter offering periods to end concurrently with the original bid. Id. at
j 203(b)(2).
2. 457 U.S. 624 (1982). In MITE, the Supreme Court invalidated the Illinois Business Take-
over Act on commerce clause grounds. See infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. "Second generation" refers to post-MITE
legislation designed to remedy perceived constitutional defects the decision exposed.
4. Despite the fact that two federal district courts declared the statute unconstitutional, Dela-
ware declined to revise its legislation. See Burlington N., Inc. v. The El Paso Co., No. 82-818 (D.
Del. December 28, 1982); Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978). Since
MITE, the states have adopted several different forms of takeover regulation. See generally Thomp-
son, Defining the Realms of Federal and State Regulation of Tender Offers, supra p. 1057.
5. As used in this Note, "target defensive tactics" refer to statutorily authorized actions in-
cumbent management undertakes in response to actual or anticipated takeover attempts to defeat or
substantially deter these threats. See generally A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RE-
SPONSES, & PLANNING 113-57 (1981); M. LIPTON & E. STEINBEROER, TAKEOVERS AND
FREEZEOUTS §§ 6.01-.09 (1986).
6. See generally infra notes 36-53 and accompanying text.
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state of incorporation tend to coincide.7 Many takeover statutes, in fact,
grant incumbent management wide discretion to exempt takeovers from
their provisions.' Ultimately, however, the state retains control over tar-
get defensive tactics through shareholder suits against incumbent man-
agement.9  Assuring management sufficient tools to fight takeover
attempts, while retaining some control over its actions, thus provides the
states an alternative method of regulating takeovers. To date, this form
of takeover regulation has eluded scrutiny under the principles of Edgar
v. MITE.10
The irony of this situation apparently did not escape the plaintiffs in
Moran v. Household International Inc.,1  who challenged target defensive
tactics approved under Delaware law. The plaintiffs argued that the con-
stitutional limitations MITE imposes on state takeover statutes should
also limit statutory authorization of target defensive tactics.' 2 The Dela-
ware Supreme Court summarily rejected plaintiff's argument, stating
only that statutory authorization of private conduct does not constitute
"state action" to which constitutional restrictions apply.' 3
This Note examines the constitutional issues raised in Moran. Part I
discusses the effect of Edgar v. MITE on state takeover regulation. Part
II discusses the analysis and effect of target defensive tactics under Dela-
ware law. Part III then dismisses the private conduct objection the Dela-
ware Supreme Court registered in Moran, and develops a rationale for
applying dormant commerce clause limitations to target defensive tac-
tics. Finally, part IV applies the constitutional analysis enunciated in
MITE to tactics sanctioned under Delaware law. This Note concludes
that target defensive tactics that effectively preclude shareholder deci-
sions on the merits of a takeover violate these principles.
7. In fact, takeover legislation often undoubtedly results from pressure incumbent manage-
ment exerts upon the state legislatures. See Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUDIES 251, 288 (1977).
8. See, eg., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-43-18, 23-1-43-19 (West Supp. 1985); MD. CORPS &
Ass'NS CODE § 3-603(c) (1985).
9. See generally infra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
10. Butsee Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd,
722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983).
11. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
12. Id. at 1353.
13. Id.
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I. STATE TAKEOVER REGULATION AND EDGAR V. MITE CORP.
Concern with the threat posed to local businesses by takeover attempts
prompted legislatures in several states to enact statutes regulating take-
overs.' 4 The earliest of these statutes required pre-commencement notifi-
cation and disclosures with respect to tender offers for businesses
incorporated within, or having some connection with, the particular
state. Some states also provided for administrative hearings into substan-
tive aspects of tender offers. Many statutes exempted offers specifically
approved by the target's board of directors.
In Edgar v. MITE Corp. 15 the Supreme Court invalidated the Illinois
Business Takeover Act, an archtypical "first generation" takeover stat-
ute, on dormant commerce clause grounds.16 Illinois sought to justify its
legislation as an attempt to protect local investors and to regulate the
internal affairs of Illinois corporations.' 7 The Court determined, how-
ever, that the statute promoted neither interest sufficiently to outweigh
the substantial burdens it imposed on interstate commerce by inhibiting
nationwide tender offers.18
Following MITE, several states reformulated their takeover statutes.
To reduce the effect of their takeover regulation on interstate commerce
14. See generally Profusek & Gompf, State Takeover Legislation After MITE- Standing Pat,
Blue Sky, or Corporation Law Concepts?, 7 CORP. L. REV. 3, 6-8 (1984); Steinbrink, Reemergence of
State Takeover Statutes, 17 INST. ON SEc. REG. 443, 447-48 (1985).
While most states sought to protect local businesses in general, some states enacted legislation
designed to thwart specific takeover attempts of corporations within the state. For example, Utah
sought to block the rumored Arab takeover of Kennecott Copper Corp. See Comment, Edgar v.
Mite Corp-- Is the Preemption of State Takeover Statutes Complete, 1983 UTAH L. REv. 415, 422-
23. More recently, Missouri enacted legislation to protect Trans World Airlines, Inc. from Carl C.
Icahn's takeover attempt.
15. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, empowers Congress to regulate interstate commerce. The
Court has long recognized that the commerce clause limits the states' ability to regulate certain
aspects of interstate commerce. See, eg., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299
(1851). Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), represents the Court's current commerce
clause analysis:
Where the [state] statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public in-
terest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree.
And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of
the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities.
Id. at 142 (citation omitted).
17. 457 U.S. at 644.
18. Id. at 646.
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most states narrowed jurisdictional coverage of their statutes.' 9 Substan-
tively, some states merely deleted provisions similar to those found objec-
tionable in MITE,2  but many states sought to regulate takeovers by
altering corporate decision-making procedures in takeover attempts.2 1
Although formulated to protect target shareholders, these statutes, by
design and effect, seek to enhance the position of incumbent management
in takeover contests.22 Lower federal courts uniformly have invalidated
one type of second-generation statute and the Supreme Court will soon
render its decision on the issue.23
19. Most states now apply their takeover regulation only to businesses incorporated in, and
having some substantial connection with, the state. See, eg., Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 351.015(1 1);
351.407 (Vernon Supp. 1986); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01(Y); 1701.83.1 (Page 1985).
20. See, eg., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.01 (West Supp. 1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2418
(1983). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the amended Minnesota statute. See
Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984). The Minnesota legislature elimi-
nated pre-commencement notification and substantive review by state officials. Its statute applies
only to corporations having at least 20% of their shareholders residing in Minnesota and substantial
assets the state.
21. So called "control share acquisition statutes" require shareholder approval of transactions
resulting in certain levels of voting power. See, eg., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 (West Supp.
1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.407 (Vernon Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.831-.832
(Page 1985). Other states require shareholder approval only of transactions occurring after a person
gains "control" of the corporation. See, e.g., MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-601-3-603, 8-
301(14) (1985); MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 21.200 (780)-(784) (Callaghan Supp. 1985); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1409.1(C) (Purdon Supp. 1985). A new "third generation" statute limits the voting power
of shares held in excess of twenty percent of a corporation's outstanding shares. Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.25 (West Supp. 1986).
In addition to requiring a shareholder vote for such transactions, several states require the bidder
to wait five years before consummating such a transaction. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-43
(Burns 1986); N.Y. Bus. CORP.LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986).
Some states also extend appraisal remedies to shareholders dissenting from "control" transactions.
See, eg., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1985). Most state corporation statutes
provide appraisal remedies to dissenting shareholders in mergers. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 262 (1983); REV. MODEL BuS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(a)(1) (1984).
22. This is done in two steps. First, the statutes establish such stringent restrictions that a
proposed tender offer becomes too expensive or risky to the offeror. See supra note 21. Then, the
statutes provide exemptions for transactions approved by target directors. All statutes exempt trans-
actions pursuant to the merger provisions of the state's corporation statute. See, e.g., IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 23-1-43-18, 23-1-43-19 (West Supp. 1985); MD. CORPS & ASS'NS CODE § 3-603(c) (1985).
Some states also permit the target corporation's incumbent directors to exclude transactions from
the statutory requirements. See, eg., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(c)(l)(McKinney 1986).
23. See Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.), prob. juris. noted,
107 S. Ct. 258 (1986); Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir.), aff'g, 637 F.
Supp. 742 (S.D. Ohio 1986); Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Haw. 1986); APL Limited
Partnership v. Van Dusen Air Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Minn. 1985); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp.
1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985). Each of these cases involved control share acquisition statutes.
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II. CORPORATE TAKEOVERS AND THE DELAWARE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE
Takeover attempts implicate a fundamental issue of corporate govern-
ance-the distribution of power between the owners and managers of
corporations. By allowing shareholders to oust corporate management
through extra-corporate procedures, tender offers represent shareholders'
most effective method of combating ineffective management.24 Target
defensive tactics, however, often enable incumbent management to pre-
vent the shareholders from considering a takeover bid altogether.25
Thus, the rules governing target defensive tactics play a critical role in
regulating takeovers.
State corporation law empowers the board of directors to manage the
corporation's "business and affairs," 26 and imposes upon directors a duty
to act in shareholders' best interests.27 When shareholders challenge
"disinterested" board decisions, the courts employ the business judgment
rule to determine director liability.28 Although takeover contests create
conflicts of interest between corporate directors and shareholders,29 the
courts nevertheless evaluate target defensive tactics under the business
judgment rule.3"
24. See generally Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control,
and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (1978).
25. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 36-51.
26. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983); REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b)
(1984).
27. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939).
28. Although often expressed in terms of deferring to the board's judgment, the business judg-
ment rule actually represents the applicable standard of care for corporate directors: if the directors
exercise appropriate care in reaching a decision, the court will uphold the directors' decision. See
Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979).
29. Takeovers, particularly in the form of tender offers, permit shareholders to sell their shares
at a substantial premium over the existing market price. Often, however, successful bidders replace
management and directors. Indeed, many bidders expect to gain only by replacing ineffective man-
agement. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Re-
sponding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1168-74 (1981).
30. See, eg., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981); Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). For critical evaluations of the development of
the business judgment rule applications to target defensive tactics, see Cherno & Raymond, Hostile
Takeovers and the Ever-Narrowing (Expanding) Business Judgment Rule, 17 INST. ON SEC. REG. 41
(1985); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender
Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 813 (1981); Goelzer, Walter, Cohen, Brown & Lopez, Recent Developments
in Battles for Corporate Control The Business Judgment Rule, and Exchange Act Section 14(e), 17
INST. ON SEC. REG. 11 (1985); Comment, The Misapplication of the Business Judgment Rule in
Contests for Corporate Control, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 980 (1982).
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Recently, the Delaware Supreme Court, beginning with Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,31 examined the proper application of the business
judgment rule in the takeover context. When confronted with a takeover
bid, the target board of directors must reasonably and in good faith in-
vestigate the offer.3 2 If it determines that the bid threatens the corpora-
tion's best interests, the board has the power and the duty to oppose the
offer. 33 However, it may adopt only those measures "reasonable in rela-
tion to the threat posed."' 34 In assessing the threat a bid poses, manage-
ment may consider the interests of creditors, customers, employees, and
the community.35
Applying this analysis, the Delaware Supreme Court has approved
several highly effective defensive tactics. In Unocal, the court upheld a
discriminatory self-exchange offer Unocal employed to defeat Mesa Pe-
troleum's takeover bid. Characterizing Mesa's bid "as a grossly inade-
quate two-tier coercive tender offer coupled with the threat of
greenmail, ' '36 Unocal mounted an exchange offer for roughly half of its
own outstanding stock.3 7 The offer excluded Mesa-held shares. This ex-
clusionary provision effectively increased by one-third the cost of Mesa's
31. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); see also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
32. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. The court recognized that "an enhanced duty" arises from "the
omnipresent specter" that directors may act in their own interests. Id. Thus, the board must show
"reasonable grounds for believing a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed because of
another person's stock ownership." Id. at 955. A good faith and reasonable investigation, however,
satisfies this burden. Id. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), establishes a "gross
negligence" standard of care with respect to the board's investigation.
33. The Unocal court acknowledged that directors have no power to act "solely or primarily
out of a desire to perpetuate themselves in office." 493 A.2d at 955. This statement represents a
traditional restriction on target defensive tactics. See Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964)
and cases cited therein; cf Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 294 (7th Cir. 1981) (plain-
tiff must show that "impermissible motives predominated" the board's decision). The Unocal court
maintained, however, that requiring "good faith and reasonable investigation" ensures that directors
act "for the welfare of the corporation and its shareholders." 493 A.2d at 955.
34. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
35. Id. at 955-56; compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408 (Purdon Supp. 1985). In Revlon, the
Delaware Supreme Court held that even though the directors may legitimately consider these con-
stituencies, "some rationally related benefit" must accrue to the shareholders. 506 A.2d at 176.
36. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956. "Two-tiered tender offer" refers to two step acquisition tech-
nique. In this case, Mesa initiated a cash tender offer for 37% of Unocal's publicly held stock at $54
per share. It simultaneously proposed to exchange debt for the remaining outstanding shares after it
completed the first step transaction, a transaction purportedly valued at $54 per share. Id. at 949.
"Greenmail" represents the premium the target pays in repurchasing the shares held by an insur-
gent or potential bidder.
37. Id. at 951.
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proposed second step transaction, dooming Mesa's bid and preventing
any further takeover attempts.38 The court nevertheless found Unocal's
actions as reasonable in relation to the threat Mesa posed.39
In Moran v. Household International, Inc.,' the court upheld an ex-
traordinarily potent "poison pill" defense.41 Household's board author-
ized a plan under which the announcement of a tender offer for thirty
percent, or acquisition of twenty percent, of its outstanding stock trig-
gered the issuance of rights to purchase a new class of stock.42 If unexer-
cised when the acquiring company completed a second step transaction,
the right entitled its holder to purchase the acquiror's common stock at a
fifty percent reduction.4 3 By design and effect, this "flip-over" provision
precluded two-tiered offers involving substantial second step transac-
tions.' Appearing amicus curiae the SEC argued that the plan deterred
virtually all hostile takeover attempts.45 The court, however, found the
38. Unocal valued the debt it offered at $72 per share. Id. Because Mesa proposed to exchange
debt valued at $54 per share for a similar number of shares, Unocal's offer effectively increased the
cost of Mesa's proposed second tier by $18 per share, or 33%. Mesa dropped its takeover bid for
Unocal. But Unocal's actions had a more permanent effect with respect to other possible attempts.
Goldman Sachs & Co. estimated that the "minimum liquidation value" of Unocal stock at $60 per
share. Id. at 950. Assuming this represents a rough estimate of the company's market value, no
bidder would be willing to pay more than an average of $60 per share. Thus, unless Unocal accepted
offers below $42 per share for the 51% of its still outstanding stock, no further bidding would occur.
39. The court identified two sources empowering the board to deal selectively with corporate
shareholders: (1) the statutory powers conferred in DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(a) (placing cor-
porate business and affairs under the board's direction) & 160(a) (permitting a corporation to deal in
its own stock); and (2) the board's "fundamental duty and obligation to protect the corporate enter-
prise... from harm reasonably perceived, irrespective of its source." 493 A.2d at 953-54.
40. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
41. The "poison pill" defense contemplates issuing preferred stock to holders of common stock
as a special dividend. When an outsider acquires a certain percentage ("control") of the company's
outstanding stock, the share entitles its holder to redeem it for cash equal to the highest price paid
for common shares necessary to obtain "control." See Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial
and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1964, 1964-65 (1984).
42. 500 A.2d at 1348-49. The rights became immediately exercisable to purchase 'Ao share of
preferred stock for $100, but Household retained the option to redeem for $0.50 per right, the rights
triggered by a tender offer announcement.
43. Id. at 1349.
44. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch. 1985).
45. See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, Moran v. Household
Int'l, Inc., at 12 [hereinafter cited as SEC Amicus Brief]. The SEC first noted that most bidders
ultimately seek full control of targets. Id. at 18. Even in any-and-all tender offers, bidders must
employ second step transactions to achieve that control, because such offers only rarely result in
acquisition of more than 80%. Id. at 20. But Household's plan precluded such transactions. Thus,
the SEC concluded, the plan completely entrenched Household management contrary to sharehold-
ers' best interests. Id. at 18.
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plan "reasonable in relation to the threat posed."46
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.47 finally con-
firmed the existence of limits on the use of target defensive tactics under
Delaware law. To defeat an obstreperous bidder and to quiet disgruntled
debtholders, 48 Revlon arranged a leveraged buy-out with Forstmann,
Little & Co. In return, Forstmann demanded a lock-up option 49 and an
agreement preventing Revlon from considering any further bids. The
court enjoined this arrangement, holding that management may not use a
lock-up to end an active bidding contest,50 at least when a desire to pro-
tect themselves from litigation partially motivates the directors.5"
Notwithstanding the apparent limits Revlon imposes on target defen-
sive tactics, the business judgment rule analysis developed in Unocal pre-
serves a central role for incumbent management in hostile takeover
46. 500 A.2d at 1357 & n.14. The court first found that the plan did not foreclose all possibility
of hostile takeovers. According to the court, bidders' options "rang[ed] from tendering with a condi-
tion that the Board redeems the Rights, tendering with a high minimum condition of shares and
Rights, and soliciting consents to remove the Board and redeem the Rights, to acquiring 50% of the
shares and causing Household to self-tender for the Rights." Id. at 1354. The SEC disagreed, ques-
tioning the "untested and highly uncertain" nature of these suggestions. SEC Amicus Brief, supra
note 45, at 21, 21-29.
The court then found statutory authorization for Household's plan in § 157 of Delaware's corpo-
ration law, which authorizes a corporation to issue rights "to purchase from the corporation any
shares of its capital stock." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (1983). The court rejected plaintiffs'
arguments, inter alia, that § 157 did not comprehend rights used as a takeover defense, 500 A.2d at
1351, or authorize rights to purchase stock in the acquiring corporation, id. at 1352.
47. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
48. In response to various overtures and tender offers by Pantry Pride, Inc., Revlon initiated
several defensive moves. First, it adopted a rights plan pursuant to which Revlon shareholders
would receive a right entitling them to exchange their shares for notes. Id. at 177. Acquisition by
anyone of 20% of Revlon's outstanding stock triggered the rights, unless the offeror consummated
an offer at or above a certain price. Id. Second, Revlon consummated an exclusionary self-exchange
offer. Id. Finally, it arranged a leveraged buy-out ("LBO") with Forstmann, Little & Co. Id at
178. To effect the LBO Revlon waived restrictive covenants contained in the notes it offered in the
exchange offer. This caused a drop in the market price of the notes, prompting "irate noteholders"
to threaten litigation. Id. The second LBO arrangement with Forstmann included an agreement by
Forstmann to boost the market value of the exchange offer debt. Id. at 178-79. The court upheld
each of Revlon's first three moves. Id. at 180-81.
49. A "lock-up" option represents an option to purchase assets or stock at a bargain price. It
usually is contingent upon failure of the option holder to complete a takeover of the target. Bidders
demand these options to compensate them for the risk and expense of undertaking a takeover. In
this case, Revlon gave Forstmann an option to purchase two Revlon divisions when any other person
acquired 40% of Revlon's shares. Id. at 178.
50. To enhance its legal position in this case, Pantry Pride announced another bid topping by
$0.75 per share the price negotiated between Revlon and Forstmann, and also offered to support the
deflated notes. Id. at 179.
51. Id. at 184.
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attempts. The Unocal analysis affords management considerable latitude
to determine which bids are "in the best interests of the corporation,"
and expands the "interests" relevant to that decision.52 Moreover, it pro-
vides management with highly effective tools to enforce that
determination.5
3
III. MORAN'S "STATE ACTION" OBJECTION
In Edgar v. MITE Corp., the United States Supreme Court restricted
the ability of the states to regulate takeover bids. When the plaintiffs in
Moran sought to apply the same restrictions to the actions of target man-
agement, the Delaware Supreme Court curtly rejected the argument.
Statutory authorization of corporate directors, the court maintained,
"provides an insufficient nexus to the state" to constitute "state action
which may violate the Commerce Clause.. .. "I'
Most "state action" challenges arise in the context of the fourteenth
amendment.56 The dormant commerce clause, however, contains an
analogous limitation. It prohibits state regulation that burdens interstate
commerce, 57 but does not apply to burdens imposed by private actors.58
In Moran, the activities alleged to impermissibly burden interstate com-
merce can be characterized as those of the target management.
In several fourteenth amendment-"state action" cases, the United
States Supreme Court has recognized that the state may so involve itself
in private conduct that the constitutional limitations on state conduct
52. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33 & 35.
53. See supra notes 36-51 and accompanying text.
54. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
55. 500 A.2d at 1353, citing Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 (2d
Cir.), rev'g 568 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). In Data Probe, the Second Circuit reversed the
lower court's holding that MITE limited state statutory authorization of target defensive tactics.
The court simply found that Congress did not intend this result. Thompson, supra note 4, at 1073-
74, rejects this rationale.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides that "No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States .... Because the amend-
ment prohibits only state malfeasances, it does not reach individual invasions of the same rights. See
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
57. See supra note 16.
58. Cf. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (5-4) (distinguishing for dormant commerce
clause purposes between states acting as "market participants" and states acting as "market regula-
tors," the Court held that when South Dakota opened a cement plant, it was acting as a private
business, and, therefore, was not subject to dormant commerce clause restrictions).
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should apply to the private activity.59 The Court recently restated the
state action inquiry as a two-part analysis.
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privi-
lege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by
a person for whom the State is responsible.... Second, the party charged
with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state
actor.60
Target defensive tactics obviously meet the first step of the state action
inquiry. The state imposes fiduciary duties upon corporate directors to
act in the best interests of the corporation's shareholders. Pursuant to
this duty, directors employ target defensive tactics.61
Under the second part of the state action inquiry, statutory authoriza-
tion of private conduct, "without something more," does not establish
state action. 62 Rather, the nexus between the state and the challenged
action must be such that the state may be said to be "responsible" for the
specific conduct.63 When the state compels or encourages the conduct,
or when an extensive, mutually beneficial "symbiotic relationship" exists
between the state and the private actors, state action exists.64 Extensive
regulation or mere approval or acquiescence is not sufficient.
The decisions in Moran and Unocal suggest that the Delaware
Supreme Court has actively enhanced the ability of target directors to
fight off hostile takeovers. Whether labeled significant encouragement or
a mutually beneficial relationship, this judicial activism should constitute
"state action" so as to trigger the dormant commerce clause restrictions.
This judicial activism of the Delaware Supreme Court has taken two
forms. First, the court appears to have broadened the business judgment
rule standard as applied to target defensive tactics. In its restatement of
the business judgment rule in Unocal, the court subtlely stifled the rule's
focus. Traditionally, the business judgment rule applies only to "disin-
terested" business decisions.65 Because target directors face an inherent
59. See, eg., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,
365 U.S. 715 (1961).
60. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
61. See supra text accompanying note 33.
62. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939; see also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974).
63. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839 (1982).
64. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840; see also
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1972); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
65. See supra text accompanying note 28.
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conflict of interest when confronted with an unwanted takeover bid, in
applying the business judgment rule the courts have focused on the mo-
tives of the target directors in blocking a takeover attempt.66 The Unocal
analysis purports to recognize the potential conflict of interest, but in-
quires only into the directors' investigation of the offer.67  The shift in
focus de-emphasizes the threat that management self-interest poses to
shareholders. Moreover, the court's expansion of the interests target di-
rectors can consider in deciding to block a takeover bid permits them to
weigh interests traditionally the concern of state governments rather
than of corporate management.
The decisions in Unocal and Moran also reveal the Delaware Supreme
Court's willingness to stretch statutory authorization to approve highly
effective defensive tactics.6 In Unocal, the court interpreted the statu-
tory provision permitting a corporation to deal in its own stocks to au-
thorize the corporation to deal selectively with corporate shareholders.69
In Moran, the court interpreted the statutory authority to issue rights "to
purchase from the corporation any shares of its capital stock' 70 to au-
thorize the corporation to issue rights to purchase shares in the acquiring
corporation.
Delaware's approval of highly effective defensive tactics by way of
broad interpretations of existing statutory authority and judicial review
of target directors' actions under a lenient business judgment analysis is
"something more" than acquiescence or mere approval of target defen-
sive tactics. Indeed, by imposing a fiduciary obligation upon target direc-
tors to resist certain takeover attempts, Delaware arguably compels the
director's conduct. In any case, the Delaware court unabashedly sides
with incumbent management. Because the interests of Delaware and the
directors of its corporations tend to coalesce, the judicial activism of the
66. See, e.g., Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964) (management may not act "solely
or primarily out of a desire to perpetuate themselves in office"); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646
F.2d 271, 294 (7th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff must show that "impermissible motives predominated" the
directors' decision).
67. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
68. In some respects, expanding the interests management can consider in takeover fights ex-
tends the directors' authority. Some second-generation takeover statutes in fact amended the state's
statutory fiduciary duty provisions to protect similar interests. See, eg., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
1 1408 (Purdon Supp. 1985). Delaware's judiciary, however, has developed that state's fiduciary
duty law.
69. See supra note 39.
70, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (1983) (emphasis added).
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Delaware court should satisfy the "state action" requirement under the
dormant commerce clause.
Through its courts Delaware has accomplished many of the regulatory
goals of anti-takeover statutes. Like second generation takeover statutes,
the target defensive tactics approved by the Delaware courts enhance the
power of target management in hostile takeover bids. This enables in-
cumbent management to protect the interests of "local" corporations and
thus the state. Substituting judicial activism for legislative action has
permitted Delaware to accomplish these goals outside the constraints im-
posed by the Supreme Court's dormant commerce clause analysis in
MITE. This result, however, seemingly contradicts the policies underly-
ing San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,7 in which the United
States Supreme Court held that the supremacy clause deprived the states
not only of their power to regulate but also of their equitable and com-
mon law jurisdiction. As the Court stated:
Our concern is with delimiting the areas of conduct which must be free
from state regulation if national policy is to be left unhampered.... Even
the States' salutary effort to redress private wrongs or grant compensation
for past harm cannot be exerted to regulate activities that are potentially
subject to the exclusive federal regulatory scheme.72
IV. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS OF TARGET
DEFENSIVE TACTICS
The commerce clause prohibits state regulation imposing burdens on
interstate commerce excessive in relation to the local interests the state
seeks to further.73 In effect, the commerce clause establishes an "exclu-
sive federal regulatory scheme" over interstate commerce. In Edgar v.
MITE Corp.,71 the Supreme Court held that state legislation authorizing
state officials to block nationwide tender offers impermissibly interfered
with this scheme. The principles the Court utilized in reaching this re-
sult apply equally to target defensive tactics which permit incumbent
management to block such tender offers.
71. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). In Garmon, non-union employers obtained an award of damages in
the California state courts for injuries resulting from the peaceful union activities of the defendants.
The National Labor Relations Board had previously refused to exercise its jurisdiction under the
National Labor Relations Act to redress those activities. Nevertheless, the Court, finding that the
Act encompassed the union activities involved in the suit, overturned the California damage award,
72. Id. at 246-47.
73. See supra note 16.
74. 457 U.S. 624, 646 (1982).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss4/6
TARGET DEFENSIVE TACTICS
A. Burdens on Interstate Commerce
The defensive tactics sanctioned in Unocal and Moran undeniably im-
pede nationwide takeover attempts. Although considerable debate about
the propriety of target defensive tactics persists,75 MITE clearly reveals
that the effects of inhibiting nationwide tender offers can outweigh the
state's interests in regulating takeovers.7 6 Judicial interpretations that
sanction target defensive tactics can inhibit interstate tender offers and
burden interstate commerce just as the statutory provisions invalidated
in MITE did."
In addition, the Delaware Supreme Court's decisions in Unocal and
Moran apparently authorize target management to block any two-tiered
offer.78 Bidders frequently utilize two-tiered takeovers to acquire larger
targets.79 Permitting management to deter any two-tiered takeover at-
tempt would shield large national corporations from takeover attempts
but leave smaller in-state corporations unaffected.80 Thus, Unocal and
Moran might actually burden interstate commerce more than a statute
authorizing management to obstruct all forms of takeovers.
B. State Benefits
In MITE the Supreme Court considered two state interests as possible
justifications for state takeover regulation: protecting resident investors
and regulating the internal affairs of corporations organized under the
state's laws." Although the business judgment rule protects corporate
75. See, eg., Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Exten-
sion, 35 STAN. L. REv. 23 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers,
35 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1982); Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer
Defense, 35 STAN. L. REv. 51 (1982); Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a
Right to Resist Tender Offers, 3 CORP. L. REv. 107 (1980); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's
Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 102 (1979).
76. 457 U.S. at 643. According to the Court, blocking tender offers denies shareholders an
opportunity to sell their shares at a premium, hinders the efficient allocation of resources and
reduces market incentives for efficient management performance. Id. (citing, inter alia, Easterbrook
& Fischel, supra note 29).
77. Indeed, in MITE the Court cited an article dealing only with target defensive tactics as
evidence of the adverse effects of inhibiting tender offers. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 36-46.
79. See Office of the Chief Economist of the SEC, The Economics of Partial and Two-Tiered
Tender Offers, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,755, reprinted in [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
83,637, at 86,920-921 (June 29, 1984) [hereinafter cited as SEC Tender Offer Study].
80. Cf id. at 86,927 (creating "regulatory disincentives" for two-tier offers "may have more
important effects for larger takeover targets than smaller targets").
81. 457 U.S. at 644.
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directors from liability to shareholders,82 it ultimately furthers share-
holders' interests. Shareholders relinquish management of the corpora-
tion's day-to-day affairs to the directors in order to maximize their
investment.8 3 The business judgment rule affords directors the discretion
necessary to carry out their managerial duties and encourages competent
persons to become directors8 4 by protecting them from mistakes of judg-
ment. 5 Moreover, the rule avoids judicial second-guessing of complex
business decisions.8 6 Thus, insofar as the Delaware court's interpretation
of the rule protects shareholders' interests in effective corporate manage-
ment, it implicates a legitimate state interest.
In MITE the Supreme Court noted that the state's interest in investor
protection did not extend to nonresident investors.8 7 The Court also
questioned whether the internal affairs doctrine could justify legislatively
imposed tender offer regulation. 8  Judicial sanctioning of target defen-
sive tactics under the business judgment rule avoids both concerns. The
business judgment rule is an integral aspect of Delaware's corporate gov-
ernance system.8 9 Federal law reserves the primary responsibility for the
regulation of corporate governance to the state of incorporation. 90 This
congressional policy favoring state regulation imparts legitimacy, under
the commerce clause analysis, to any state regulation of corporation gov-
ernance. 91 The business judgment rule thus reflects Delaware's legiti-
82. See supra text accompanying note 28.
83. See generally Anderson, Conflicts of Interest. Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure,
25 UCLA L. REv. 738 (1978).
84. See Note, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 621, 650-51 (1983).
85. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
86. See Note, supra note 84, at 650-51.
87. 457 U.S. at 644.
88. Id. at 645-46. The Court first belittled the internal affairs doctrine as only a conflict of laws
principle. But the Court proceeded to state that the doctrine could not justify state tender offer
regulation. Tender offers involve transfers of stock to third parties. Thus, the Court maintained,
tender offers do not involve corporate internal affairs. The Court also noted that the Illinois statute
applied to corporations not incorporated in Illinois.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
90. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1978); Thompson, supra note 4, at 1059.
91. Cf Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (state highway regulations
carry a presumption of validity because of the "peculiarly local nature of this subject of safety");
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (upholding a burdensome city
pollution ordinance partially relying on a congressional policy of leaving pollution regulation to state
and local government); cf Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (existence of state
remedies for the challenged conduct bears directly on the issue of whether Congress intended a
federal cause of action under securities laws).
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mate interest in regulating the internal affairs of its corporations, even
though the rule affects the interests of nonresident investors.
The applications of the business judgment rule in Unocal and Moran
nevertheless raise serious questions as to whether the business judgment
rule actually benefits shareholders, and therefore advances legitimate lo-
cal interests.92 The rule presumes that investors have alternatives to de-
rivative suits, including hostile takeover attempts, for resolving policy
disputes with management.93 Judicial authorization of target defensive
tactics which all but destroy those alternatives runs contrary to the poli-
cies reflected by the rule and to shareholder interests. Moreover, when
management tactics cause obvious and immediate harm to target share-
holders,94 judicial reluctance to second-guess those actions seems
unjustified.
In both Unocal and Moran, target management evinced more concern
about the use of allegedly unfair tender offer tactics, namely two-tiered
tender offers and greenmail, than for shareholder interests.95 Admit-
tedly, the directors argued that these tactics were unfair to shareholders,
but close scrutiny of these allegations demonstrates that sheltering share-
holders from these tactics offers at best uncertain protection of share-
92. In APL Limited Partnership v. Van Dusen, 622 F. Supp. 1216, 1221 (D. Minn. 1985), the
court pointed out that the commerce clause balances burdens and benefits. Thus, the court stated,
the state must show not only that the statute seeks to further legitimate state interests, but in fact
furthers those interests. Id., citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 644 (questioning whether the
Illinois Business Takeover Act "substantially enhances the shareholders' position").
93. Because the rule protects business decisions whether "good" or "bad," provided the direc-
tors meet the appropriate standard of care in reaching their decisions, see supra note 29 and accom-
panying text, it must presume shareholders remain free to redress policy disputes with ineffective
management or replace it.
94. For instance, Unocal's assertion that it protected its shareholders is simply untenable.
First, the Unocal offer increased Unocal's leverage beyond that implied in Mesa's proposed second
step transaction. Although the increased premium might have compensated Unocal noteholders for
the increased risk of failure, the remaining shareholders received no additional compensation. In-
deed, the decline in Unocal's stock price further increased the costs to the remaining shareholders.
The combined effect of becoming a Unocal debtholder and remaining a shareholder as a result of
proration undoubtedly reduced the additional premium acquired in the exchange offer. Second, the
directors knew the offer would involve "placing restrictive covenants upon certain corporate activi-
ties until the obligations were paid." 493 A.2d at 951. Third, "[t]he directors were told that the
primary effect of this obligation [the exchange offer debt] would be to reduce exploratory drilling,
but that the company would nonetheless remain a viable entity." Id. at 950. Creating more financial
risk while severely restricting the corporation's ability to maintain a high level of cash flow in the
long term, undoubtedly harmed the corporation.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 36 & 44; see also Dennis, Two-Tiered Tender Offers and
Greenmail: Is New Legislation Needed?, 19 GA. L. REv. 281, 319 (1985) (target management at-
tempts to justify some defensive tactics solely on the ground of the unfairness of two-tiered offers).
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holders' interests. Although two-tiered tender offers result in greater
shareholder coercion than single-step offers,9 6 an SEC study suggests that
two-tiered offers do not unfairly coerce target shareholders.97 In addi-
tion, greenmail, although harmful to target shareholders,98 is a defensive
tactic. Target shareholders suffer only if target management actually
pays greenmail to defeat a takeover.99 Justifying defensive tactics on the
basis of a threat that target management poses to its own shareholders'
best interests stands the law on its head.
C. Balancing Burdens and Benefits
Delaware's business judgment rule reflects a strong state interest in
regulating the internal affairs of corporations organized under its laws.
The rule also implicates the state's interest in protecting investors. Up-
holding the target defensive tactics involved in Unocal and Moran, how-
ever, over-extends the business judgment rule without conferring
significant benefits on target shareholders. These concerns undermine
the alleged state interest in sanctioning such tactics under the business
judgment rule." On the other hand, MITE recognizes the significant
burden that target defensive tactics place on interstate commerce. These
96. See Note, supra note 41, at 1966.
97. See SEC Tender Offer Study, supra note 79; see also Dennis, supra note 95 (two-tiered
tender offers do not unfairly coerce shareholders and are in shareholders' best interests). The SEC
study examined the relative frequency, and comparative premiums, of two-tiered, any-and-all, and
partial tender offers. The evidence showed that bidders employed two-tiered offers relatively infre-
quently and mainly to acquire large targets. SEC Tender Offer Study, supra note 79, at 86,921.
Moreover, the study found that although premiums in any-and-all offers exceeded two-tiered premi-
ums, the difference between the two was small, especially in comparison with premiums in partial
offers. Id. Thus, while any-and-all offers might moderately increase shareholder wealth, deterring
two-tiered offers might completely forestall takeover attempts of larger firms. The study concluded
that target shareholders' losses from deterring takeovers, even though relatively few, can outweigh
gains from the increased premium realized. Id. at 86,927.
98. See Office of the Chief Economist of the SEC, The Impact of Targeted Share Repurchases
(Greenmail) on Stock Prices, [1984-85 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 83,713, at
87,174 (Sept. 11, 1984) [hereinafter cited as SEC GreenmailStudy]; see also Dennis, supra note 95, at
335-37 (noting other studies reporting similar findings). The SEC study examined stock prices from
the date the bidder made its initial purchases until the target company repurchased the bidder's
shares at a premium. The study found an overall negative, although small impact on stock prices
and shareholder wealth, particularly in struggles for control, and concluded that greenmail pay-
ments were not in shareholders' best interests. This study has some notable flaws. In particular,
measuring prices to the date of announcement of the repurchase may not permit the market enough
time to fully incorporate the new information. Moreover, the repurchase may indicate more
strongly management's intention to ward off perhaps all offers. See Dennis, supra note 95, at 336-37.
99. See SEC Greenmail Study, supra note 98, at 87,174.
100. Cf Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 644-47 (after questioning whether state legislation
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burdens may outweigh Delaware's uncertain interest in continuing to
sanction these tactics.
V. CONCLUSION
Edgar v. MITE Corp. restricts the ability of states to regulate corporate
takeovers. Yet sanctioned under Delaware's business judgment rule, tar-
get defensive tactics provide equally effective takeover regulation. The
fact that target directors initiate the "regulatory" conduct should not in-
sulate target defensive tactics from MITE's constitutional restrictions.
For in the context of hostile takeovers, the state, through its judiciary,
actively sides with incumbent management. Consistent with the consti-
tutional principles enunciated in MITE the courts should prohibit target
defensive tactics which effectively preclude shareholder consideration of
hostile tender offers.
Kevin W Barrett
substantially furthered the state's interest, the Court concluded that the burdens of inhibiting inter-
state tender offers outweighed legitimate state interests).
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